Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1985

Smith v. Murray
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Smith v. Murray. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 130. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Court

CA -

4

·voted on .................. ,

1B.. .

Argued . . ................. , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 191. .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No. 85-5487

MICHAEL MARNELL SMITH, Petitioner
VB.

ALLYN R. SIELAFF, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

09/24/85 - Cert.

1-~~r

HOLD

FOR

CERT.
G

Burger, Ch. J . ........... . ... .
Brennan, J .................... V

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DI S

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

'/ ::::4.4.r. ·. ::.:.....

.... .j,h . ~· .... .
Marshall, J .............................. ·~ ...... .
White, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ../

Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . {

. .f:r 'f.--. .~ .• .I ..(.....

2. . .. .

1/'
'
Powell, J ................................................
.
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~

.... •)'
~' ... ~· . . . . . . . . . . . ..

O'Connor, J ........................

V ............

Stevens, J ................... .. ( .. . ~ ... ~J .. ~f-:'. l

'!. .~ ...... ..

....... .

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

C+~~

( ~ 'k-1 If-/~
-~~~~~
~r- . )
~~9

l

~ ·S ~5' h~/..;::iA_~ ~

~~ &r-.~1-o~/~

&/!:

/._e,tf-

.bJ/'.

~ ~)..el ~ "".~~L.LM.~~

~ ~..o r~ ~~ (a-

~

J.o

~~,

71-<- ~~1

1--<-z-~ ~k ~A-~-~~
~~

October 18, 1985
List 2, Sheet 4

~~~~-

Date set:

Con~erence

10/~4/85)

~ ~4-0(~)

No.

8 ~~~t( ~ ~

Smith

v.

(murderer)
~ v ~c::.,t

>_.

~~~

Sielaff (warden)

contends:

Federa ~abe3

./

SUMMARY:

1.

petr

Murnaghan,

Cert t
L.-4!.. h'arrin

(1)

In

that

this

-

first

admission

of

federal

rri.me1y

habeas

psvchiatric

pet] tion,

testimony

to

prove future dangerousness violated his Fifth Amendment Privilege
against self
Steohens

I

incrimination;

in holding

that,

(2}

even

that the rA4 misapplied Zant v.
assuming

that

the testimony was

unconstitu · onally der i. ved, the death sentence could stand be-n
e w,o- w ··~-\€ r Ca. l""'-o J U"'- }; ~ree.. IN'~~ re_Q.)oNi1-) ~
~·\.SO...!J•fe. w i.
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cause the iurv found another untajnted aggravati~~ circumstance~
(3) that he was deprived of etfective assistance of
(4)

that

the

jury

instructions

were

counsel~

and

inconsistent with Lockett

because they failed to make clear that the iury retained the prerogative of recommending life even if it found one or more aggravating circumstances.
FAC'T'S AND nECIS IONS BELOW: Pe tr was

2.

and

sentenced

Weiller.

to

death

for

the

1977

found qui J. tv

rape/murder

of

Au~rev

One day after he gave a full confession and was arrest-

ed, the court appointed David Pugh to represent him.

Pugh imrne-

diately requested that petr be examined to netermine whether he
was competent to stand trial.

After the examiner concluded that

he was, Pugh began to explore the possibility of presenting psychiatric
end,

evidence

as

a

mitigating

circumstance.

Towards

that

he requested and

trists

to

received permission to hire two osvchiainterview petr. ~---------------------Prior to both interviews Puqh in-

structed petr not to nivulqe anv information concerning the murder or any prior offense. Appx at 68.

That advice went unheeded.

During

stated

the

second

examination,

oetr

that

several

vears

earJier, while employed as a school bus driver, he had torn off a
girl's clothes before deciding not to rape her.

Prior to this

revelation, the psychiatrist, Dr. Pile, encouraged petr to make a
full disclosure of any orior criminal behavior.

Or. Pile did not

warn petr that his statements might later be adduced at trial.
Nor did he inform him that copies of his report might be sent to
the Commonwealth and to the court.

- 3 -

~ut

At the sentencing hearinq, the prosecution
nesses, including Dr. Pile.

on four wit-

Over petr's objection, he described

--.....,

petr's account of the school bus

On cross examination,

inci~ent.

Pugh asked him about his diagnosis of petr.

Pjle responded 'l:'l y

suggesting that he was a sociopathic personality and that he had
a proclivity towards sexual deviancy and rape.
12 character witnesses and petr's oarents.

he was a
driver,

Petr then called

They testified that

regular churchgoer, a member of the choir, a good bus
a

conscientious

student

good soldier in Vietnam.

i.n high

school

and

had

been a

His parents also testified about his

model life on the tamily owned GospeJ Spreadinq r.hurch Farm.
jury

returned

and the

trial judge accepted a

The

recommendation o f

death.

The iury ind1cated that it had found two statutory aggra-

vating

circumstances:

future

~

dangerousness

and

the

~

vile" nature of the offense.

-

"wantonlv

~

The
tence.

~irginif3.

Supreme r.ourt affirmet1 the conviction and sen-

Petr did not assign as error the admission of Dr. Piles

testimony.

-

Although Amicus Post-Conviction Assistance Proiect of

the University of Virginia Law School did
court's lengthy opinion did not address
cert, 441
Petr

u.s.

967

raise the

it.

issue, the

This court denied

(1979).

then petitioned

for

state t;>ost conviction relief.

J:.Tis

principal contention was that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel.

In the context of

re4ectinq

that conten-

tion, the court fully discussed the claim that Piles's testimonv
was

inadmissible.

Although

the opinion

is not entirelv cleaT:',

the purpose of the discussion seems to have been to answer the

- 4 -

argument that failure to appeal on this point ref ected constitutionally deficient representation.

See App.

'57-72.

In conclud-

ing that Pugh's failure to appeal was understandable in liqht of
the circumstances of

the case and

the state of

the

1 aw

at

the

time of trial, the court confronted and reiected the claim tl-Jat
~

admission of the testimony violated petr's Fifth or Sixth

-

ment

rights.

Petr

again denied,

again petitioned for

u.s. ] 128

454

(1981).

cert,

Amen~-

and the petn was

The memo writer focused ex-

elusively on the ineffective assistance claim.
Petr then

instituted the present petition t:or haheas relief

in the federal district court (EDVa, MacKenzie).
an evidentiarv hearing, the
v CA4 affirmed.
miss ion
Sykes.
Smith

of

Without holding

court dismissed the Petition.

The

It acknowledged that petr 's objection to the ad-

Pile's

testimony

might

be

bar red

by rRai nwd qht

v.

Nonetheless, it concluded that "the imminent execution of
serves

merits."

as

App.

sufficient

6.

Turning

that petr 's claim was

grounds

to

review the

to the "merits,"

foreclosed

by

issue on the

the court

Zant v.

Stepl-Jens,

conclu~eo

462

u.S.

-~

862, 884 (1983).

Because the iurv had found two aggravating cir-

cumstances, one of which was
any

difference

improper.

The

whether
court

the

also

inrHsputahlv valid, it didn't make
admission

reiected

of Piles's

the claim

prived of effective assistance of counsel.

that

testimony

was

petr was de-

Counsel's failure to

explore more fully the possibility that petr suffered from a potentially debilitating mental incapacity was entirely reasonable
given that the psyciatrists who testified would have denied such
a condition.

Finally, the court rejected petr's challenge to the

- 5 -

jury charge at the sentencing hearing.
dieted that the iury was not to impose the sentence of neath i.f
it concluded that mitigating circumstances justified life imprtsonment instead.
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the CA4 's rel i. a nee

'3.

on Zant v. Stephens was clearly incorrect.
for

the proposition that

That case does stand

in some circumstances a neath sentence

supported by two aggravating circumstances remains valid even if
one of them is subsequently found improper.

But the decision was

expressly ljmited to instances in which the the evidence adduced
in support of the invalid circumstance was itself admissible.

If

admission of Piles's

testimony was

Amendment,

is simp1y not a proper basis for affirming

Stephens

i.n fact barred by the Sixth

the conviction.
Turning
contends

that

Gibson v.

to

the

the

TC

substantive
erred

in

Si.xth Amendment
admitting

Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 80

that "[a]n

Pile's

(CA4 1978)

question,
testimony.

!n

the Court held

incriminating statement made during a psychiatric ex-

ami nation cannot be used

to prove a

defendant's guilt, whether

the defendant or the prosecutor requested the examination."
CA4 's

netr

rationale

was

that

a

The

defenf!ant cannot adequately explore

possible psychological f!efenses unless the psychiatric examiners
are free

to make a full inquiry concerning the circumstances of

the offense or any prior related offenses.

Thus, petr contends,

he was put to an unconstitutional chojce:

to either talk freely

to the psychiatrist but risk having his words could come back to
haunt him,

or

to remain silent and there by foreclose meaningf:ul

-

6 -

inquiry into psychiatric defenses.

Whether the rtqht js found in
I

the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, the ooint is that the nefendant
needs access to a psychiatric evaluation to defend himself, ann
his right to defend himself is severely compromised, if not completely undermined,

i.f

he must surrender his privilege aqainst

self incrimination as the price for expJoring passible defenses
in exculpation or mitigation.

This Court should grant cert to

establish

not

that

the

state

may

condition

access

to

rnentaJ

health assistance on a waiver of f i tth amendment rights.

In so

ruling, the Court would be adopting a position consistent with
virtually every state and federal court that has confronted the
issue.

See,

e.

!l_.,

United

States

v.

AJverez,

'519

F.2d

1036,

1 0 45-4 7 ( CA3 19 7 5) •

Petr next contends that Pugh's representation was constitutionally deficient in the following respects: 1) by advising oetr
to remain silent during his psvchiatric interviews, thus precluding meaningful exploration of

defenses~

/.) by failure to prepare

adequately for cross-examination of the psychiatric witnesses and
thereby
Dr.

accidently eliciting extremely damaging

testimony from

and 3) by failing to acquire the minjmally sufficient

Piles~

knowledge

necessary to impeach Piles's

diagnosis~

4) by failing

to adequately investigate the only meaningful defense, the presence of mitigating mental abnormalities within the meaning of Va.
Code Ann.

~

19.2-264.4(B).

Perhaps counsel's chief fault was in

failing to inform the interviewing osvchiatrists about the nature
of

the

various

nefenses

available

under Va.

law

so

that

thev

could focus their examination. Moreover, the record makes clear

- 7 -

that

counsel's

meaninq

of

incompetence

Strickland

v.

was

hiqhly

prejudidial

.

'I

~he

Washington.

tri~l

within

record

the

shows

clearly that the jury relied on Piles' testimony and was encouraged to do so by the prosecutor.

In fact, on two occasions, ju-

rors

testimony

interrupted

the psychiatric

explanations of the diagnoses.

P rej ud ice

to
is,

ask

f.:or

furt11er

the ref ore, man i-

fest.
Finally,

petr

contends

that

the

iury

instructions

at

the

sentencing phase were constitutionally defective. The TJ charged
as follows:
~he Court instructs the jury that the penalty
of death shall not be imposed unless you find
that the ~ommonwea1th has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that:

1. fthe dangerousness

2.

circumstance]~

rThe vileness circumstance]

You may fix his punishment at death.
If you find that the C::ornmonweal th has
failed to prove either (1) or (2) above beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you find that
other mitjgating circumstances do not iustify
a sentence of death, you may fix the defendant's punishment at life imprisonment.

The

constitutional

defect

which explicitly states that

lies

in

the

second

paragraPh,

the iury is permitted to impose a

life sentence if the Commonwealth fails to prove an aqgravating
circumstance or
cumstance.

if the iury finds a superseding mitigating cir-

The instruction provides no express guidance to the

jury as to what it should do if it finds an aggr a vat i nq circumstance and no superseding mitigating circumstance.

However,

it

-

8 -

clearly implies that the jury is required to imp~e a ~eath sen-

'

tence in such a case.
of the scale."

'rhus, it puts a "thumb on the death sine

Petn at 49.

At the very least, it 5s confusing

and thus deprived petr of the kind of guidance necessarv to avoid
arbitrary imposition of the death sentence.

'l'he Eighth Amendment

~ury

be instructed that it

requires, at the very least, that the

retains the option of recommending life in all cases, even when
if finds aggravating circumstances. See Spivey v. Zant,
464

661 F.2d

(CAS 1981); Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882, 891 (CAI1 1.).

/

Resp maintains that Wainwright v. Svkes, bars consideration
of

petr 's claim that Piles'

testimony was improperly admitted.

Under the rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, only errors
assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed. Petr's failure to appeal this claim now forecloses review.
testimony

at

the

state

habeas

hearing

j

Moreover, Pugh's

nd icates

that

he con-

sciously eJected not to pursue that claim because, at the time,
he didn't think it was meritorious. Because Pugh's representation
was

constitutionally

adequatL

nd

because

does not constitute "cause," Engle v.

Issac,

perceived
456

u.s.

futility
107,

130

n.36 (1982), there is no possible basis for reviewing this claim.
Even were the issue open, resp continues, Dr. Piles's testimony was admissible. See Smith v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1248 (CA1J
1984) •

As the state court expl ici tl y found, Pugh expl ici tl y and

repeatedly

advised

psychiatrist.
waived

by

his

petr

Whatever
decision

not

to discuss past offenses with the

rights petr
to

talk

may have

candidly

with

had

were

Piles.

clearly
In

any

-

9 -

I

event, the CA4 correctly concluded that 0ant v. ,§' tephens renders
anv

error

harmless.

Even

were

'

Zant

inapplicable,

admission

o~

testimony concerning the school bus must be consielerecl harmless
in

light

that

of

was

rape.

the

overwhelming

properly

admit ted,

Resp also denies

evidence

of

including

a

future
prior

nangerousness
conviction

for

that Pugh's representation was def ici.ent

and that the jury instruction was in any way erroneous.
4.

DISCUSSION:

1. Non-certworthy issues.

Neither the ineffective assist-

ance claim or the challenge to the iury instructions is substanti al.
doubt

No doubt,
very much

Pugh
that

could
hj s

have

been

better

representation

f. ell

prepared.

But

I

outs ine the broad

range of competence tolerated by the Sixth Amendment.

l-Ie put on

some fourteen witnesses at the sentencing hearing in an effort to
adduce evidence in mitigation.
tion

of

the

Although he bunglen the presenta-

psychiatric evidence

investigate that avenue of nefense.
ment

he

made

a

heartfelt

petr's mental condition.

pi. tch

somewhat,

he nid meaninqfullv

In~een,

in his closing argu-

for

leniency

See S.A. 17-19.

on

the

bas is

of

On balance, I believe

that the level of representation was sufficiently hjgh to satisfy
the Sixth Amendment.
As to the challenge to the charge, even if the Constitution
does
all

require the sentencing judge to inform the iury that it at
times

retains

the option of

recommending life,

'T'ucker,

F.2d, at 891, the jury instructions here would pass muster.
though not a model of clarity, as I read the charge it

~ully

724
Alcon-

veyed the message that the jury was free to recoJTUTiend life even

- 10 -

if if found one or more aggravating ci~cumstance~.

.

ing

the

stated,

"dangerousness"
"you may fix

and

"vileness"

After recit-

~r

circumitances,

the

Moreover,

his punishment at death."

balance of the charge suggested quite clearly that

TJ

the

if the iury

found "other mitigating circumstances" it could fix the punishment at life whether or not it the state had proven an aggravat-

2.

Petr's obiection to the ad-

troubling ~n- ~

mission
deed,

as dis cussed below,

ment's

use

of

statements

the constitutionality of the governmade

by

a

defendant

to

a

psychiatrist is almost certainly a certworthy issue.

nefense-

The diffi-

cult question is whether this case is an appropriate vehicle for
resolving the
1) whether the

issue.

I divide the discussion into three parts:
v
is certworthy; 2) whether Zant v. Stephens

issue

renders the error, if any, irrelevant; and 3) whether the claim
has been defaulted under Wainwright v. Sykes.
a. The Issue.
1978),

the

court

In Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581
hel~

categorically

that

F.2~

"faln

75, 80 (CA4

incriminating

statement made durinq a psychiatric examination cannot be used to

-

prove a defendant's guilt, whether the defendant or the prosecutor requested the examination • . . "

The rationale for the CA4's

holding is that a defendant cannot adequately explore psychological defenses unless the psychiatric examiners are free to make a
full inquiry into the circumstances of the offense or anv prior
related offenses.
right

to

prepare

Id., at 79.
a

meaningful

A defendant has an affirmative
defense.

That

right

would

be

.
l

- 11 -

abridged, the court held, if its exercise were

co ~ditioned upon a

waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against seJf incrimination.

Id., at 80.

A number of other courts have reached a simi-

lar conclusion, locating the right variously in the Fifth, Sixth,
and

Fourteenth

Reifsteck,

Amendments.

See,

535 F.2d 1030, 1034 n.l

_g_.,

e.

United

(CAB 1_976)

States

v.

(Fifth Amendment)

(dicta); United States v. Alverez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-1047(1975)
(Sixth Amendment:

"The at tornev must be free to make an informer'!

judgment with respect to the best course of the nefense without
the

inhibition

Collins
See

v.

also,

of

Augur,
ABA

creating

a

428 F.Supp.

Standards

for

potential
1079

(S.D.

Criminal

-----------

qovernment
Iowa)

~ustice

witness.");

(due

process).

(mental

----------

health-

criminal justice standards) 7-3.2.
Although the rule announced by the CA4 in Gibson is clearly
the prevailing view, at least one circuit has reached prec isel v
the

opposite

1258-1259

result.

In Smith v. Wainwright,

741 P.2d

1248,

(CAll 1984), the court held that the state was tree to

introduce uncounselea, unwarned statements made by a defendant to
an examining

psychiatrist

tained by the defense.

as long as the psychiatrist was

re-

u.s.

454

Relying on Bstelle v. Smith, 451

(1981), the court took the position--in direct conflict with the
CA4 in Gibson--that the Constitution was

implicated only if the

psychiatrist was an agent of the state.
In view of the apparent conflict in the circuits, the qeneral importance of the issue, and the recurring nature of the orohlem,

I

believe that the constitutionality of the qovernment' s

use of statements made by an accused to a defense Psychiatrist is

-------------------------------------------------

·.
'·

- 12 -

a question worthy of this Court's attention.
have faced the
if

introduced

to

prove

oui 1 t.

Presumably,

~

the

Oklahoma,

I

issue have concluden that such use

u.s.,

holdings--read in light of Smith, 451
v.

Mpst courts that

105 S.Ct. 1087, 1097

sentencing phase of

the

is prohi bi teo

logic of

these

at 462-463, and

Ake

(1985)--would apply fully

a capital

trial.l

Last

to

term the ~ourt

recognized "that when the State has made defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment
he

might

suffer,

the

assistance

of a

psychiatrist may well

crucial to the nefendant's ability to marshal
105 s.ct.,
either

at 1095.

If the defendant

censuring himself

during his

is out

be

his defense." Ake,
to the choice of

osychiatric examinatjon or

divulging information that wi)l later be used to convict of sentence him, the value of the psychiatric assistance will inevitably be diminishecL

Whether or how this forced choice rises to

the level of a cons tit uti. ona l error is far from clear.
of the confusion among the lower courts, however, the

In

1_i

ght

issue ap-

pears to warrant clarification in this Court.2

1

The case for inadmissibility is even stronger where, as
here, the
defendant does not himself put his mental state in
issue.
As far as I can tell, Piles testified before the defense
put on any witnesses at all nuring the sentencing phase. It also
appears that Piles did not intend to put the defendant's mental
state into issue during the sentencing phase. All of the 14 witnesses he called were character witnesses. He only addressed the
mental issue during his closing arqument after the psychiatric
testimony had been admitted through the government's witnesses.
2

I no not believe that the fact that Pugh told petr not
to talk freely to Piles implies a "waiver" or in any other way
undermines petr's claim.
Tn fact, i.t highlights the problem.
Because of the fear that the statements would be admittea, petr's
own lawyer found it necessary to significantly curtai_l the pros(Footnote continued)

- 13 -

~Zant

v. Stephens. The

~essentially as~$med

[?

---+t

sion of Piles's testimony was constitutional error.

V" Zant v. Stephens, however,

t11at admisRelying on

it concluded, that the error was i_r-

relevant since it only went to future dangerousness and since the
jury had found another valid aggravating circumstance.
I believe that the court's reliance on Step11ens was plainly
incorrect.

Under the CA4's reading of that oecision, any

an~

all

evidence, no matter how unconstitutionally derived, is admissible
provided that the jury finds at least one valid aggravating circumstance.

Whatever else Stephens may say, it simp] y t:loes not

support this rather remarkable holding.3

The Stephens court did

find that a death sentence imposed under Georgia law need not be
overturned merelv because one of the statutory aggravating circumstances was later found to be unconstitutionally vague.
in reaching that conclusion, t 11e r.our t

But

repeated 1 y stressed that

the evidence introduced in support of the ultimately invalidated

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)
pect of a meaningful exploration of possible psychiatric c'lefenses. Moreover, although petr did divulge t11e school bus incident, it is impossible to know whether or to what degree he censured his other comments during the interview. ~or do I consider
the State's harmless error argument colora":>le.
Puqh put on 14
witnesses who testified to oetr' s moral character. In this context, I doubt very much that admission of a statement that he han
ripped the clothes off of a school gi_ rl and contemplated assaulting her could be considered harmless beyond a reasonable c'loubt.
3 Under the CA4's reasoning, a statement elicited from the
defendant at gunpoint would be admissible to show "future dangerousness" provided that the iury also found another aggravating
circumstance, for example that the murder was committed nuring
the course of a felony

- 14 -

aggravating circumstance was itself admissible. 4~2

u.s.,

,\

888.

Clearly,

if

the

admission

of. Pi.les'

at 886-

tesimonv was

error,

Stephens pro vi des no bas is for disregarding i. t.

whet

We are

left then with the question

~is

properlv preserved obiection

petr's failure to

to

forecloses

question

in

turn

divides

claim was defaulted

at

into

all;

federal

three

2)

if

habeas

inquiries:

so, what

review.
1)

This

whet~er

standard should

the
he

applied to determine whether the claim is nonetheless reviewable;
and 3) has petr satisfied that standard in this case.
1.

By

Virqinia

definition,

the claim would be defaulted only if the

Courts considered

noncompliance

with

a

procedural

qui rement to he a bar to further review in the state courts.
first glance,

that appears

ordinarily decline

to

ceeding if it was not
205

SE~d

680

to be

the case.

revi. ew a claim
~aised

reAt

Vir qi ni a courts do

in a post-conviction pro-

on appeal.

See Slayton v. Parriqan,

(1974). See also, rr:'he Virginia r_.awver, Basic Prac-

tice Handbook ~14.2.

It is well established, however, that non-

compliance with a state procedural rule will not bar federal habe as review
open.

if the state courts themselves treated the claim as

Arguably, that

is the case here.

The state habeas court

did explicitly address petr's objection to the admission of the
Piles's testimony.
ble

to

tell

from

'rhe difficulty is that it is all but impossithe opinion whether

the

court confronted the

claim on the merits or merely addressed it in passing in the context of rejecting petr's ineffective assistance claim.

69-71.

Although

the

issue

is close,

I conclude that

See ADP.
the state

habeas court did not in fact resolve petr's

con~titutional

and that, t'I-Jerefore, the claim is not open on
less noncompliance with the state rule

fe',~ eral

claim

haheas un-

is somehow excused unc1er
de~au1ts.

the applicable standard for evaluating procedural

2. The Court has never explicitly decided whether the Wain-=------·----·--------~

wright

v.

Svkes

"cause

"deliberate bypass"

and

pre i ud ice"

------..--

test or

standard applies where,

the Fay v.

Noi a

as here, a claim is

properly preserved at trial but not raised on appeal. See Svkes,
433 u.s., at 88 n.l2 (reserving question); but see
104 s.r:t.

?.901

(1984)

Reed v. 'Ross,

(apparently assuming that Sykes applies).

And the lower courts are in substantial disarray over the issue.
See Note,

133 Colum. L.

Postconviction

Rev.

Remedies

975, 1002, n.l57

131-132

(1983

(1983); L. Yackle,

supp.).

In

the

circum-

stances of this case, however, I doubt anything turns on the distinction.

Accordingly,

I

analyze

demanding" cause-and-prei ud ice
456 u.s. 107, 130 n.36
3.

Prejudice

is

the

default

test of Svkes.

under

the

Engle v.

"more

Isaacs,

(1981).
apparent,

------------

see

supra

note

2.

'T'hus ,

t '1-Je

~

availability of habeas
for"

failure

review turns on whether there was "cause

---------------------

to appeal the constitutional claim.

Assuming that

the Tn;ffective assistance claim is insubstantial, 4 the only iustification for counsel's omission is that at the time of the appeal the claim was virtually certain to fail under Virginia law.

4 Although the petn implicates the question whether ineffective assistance may constitute cause, it does so sufficientlv
obliquely that a hol_d for Sielaff v. Carrier, is probably not
warranted.

V'1

r

'•

I

do

not pretend

to

understand

?

precisely how Re ed v.

:Ross an-:'1

II

/

Engle

v.

ceived

Isaac

futility

contrast,
that

can be

held

its

alone
that

reconciled.
cannot

constitute

"where a

legal basis

is

not

Engle

suggesled

cause."

constitutional

that

Id.

claim

"per-

Reed,

is

so

in

novel

reasonably available to counsel, a

defendant has cause for his failure to raise his claim in accordance with applicable state procedures."
the

extent

that

the

unlikelihooil

of

J04

s.~t.,

success

at 2910.

does

'T'o

constitute

"cause," petr can plausibly argue that his case falJ .s within the
spirit, i_f not the letter of Reed.
Ake,

Estelle v.

His trial and appeal Predated

Smith, and other cases

in th i. s Court that have

recognized that psychiatric interviews can be critical, constitutionally
More

protected

events

importantly, as

in

capital

sentencing

proceedings.

the State habeas court expl ici tl y acknowl-

edged, app 71, under Virginia law petr's objection to the admission of Pile's testimony had no chance of success.
Commonwealth,
supra.

Va.

~onetheless,

the case
line.

216

412

(1975),

Gibson

v.

with no shortage of ooubt,

falls on the Engle

Reed seems

rev'd

See Gibson v.

rather

Zahradnic'<,

I believe that

than the Reed

side of

the

to be limited to instances in which counsel's

failure to raise a claim is attributable not so much to the certainty of failure but
"discovered"

in

(cause

counsel

ence").

where

the

to the fact that the right has vet to be
Constitution.
is

"unaware

Reed,
of

104

s.ct.,

question's

latent

at

2910

exist-

Undoubtedly, in Virginia in 1977 it would have been fu-

tile for petr to pursue his objection to the admission of Piles'
testimony.

But it is very hard to say that there was no "J egal

.•

.• -

basis" for his claim when an amicus

di~

apparently make precisely

l

the argument petr now wishes to pursue on habea~.

Moreover, in

1975, two years before trial. , the CA3 had already adopted virtually the same position, petr now espouses.
though the

issue

is extremely

clos~,

Alvarez,

supra.

Al-

I conclude that the claim

has been defaulted.
Because this is a capital case, because this is a first habeas petition,

and

because

the execution

than a week after conference,

tressing

conclusion

that

the

is

-

set

analysis

is

less

oetn

I have reached the dis-

Presents

a

certworthy

but that the claim is not open for review on federal
habeas

for

I have tried to l_ay the arguments

In so doing,

out as fully as possible.

date

Potentially

vulnerable

in

two

issue

~abeas.

~y

respects.

~

~ it is not wholly clear that the state habeas court did not
confront the

issue raised in this petn.

plausible

argue

that

to

that

the

there was "cause" for

.....____

is incorrect on

eit~er

should be granted.

claim here

~'
is

it is certainly

-

sufficently "novel"

failure to raise it •

If my analysis

of these points, I believe that the petn

For now, however, I am constrained to

re~om-

mend: DENY.

There is a response.
IFP status is proper

October 10, 1985

Cerf

opn in oetn
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SMITH SALLY-POW

85-5487 Smith v. Sielaff (CA4)
MEMO TO FILE:
This

is

(petitioner)
capital

was

murder

conceded,
phase

and

of

Virginia capital case

convicted
and

rape

by

of

a
a

jury

trial.

circumstances,

had

one

of

for

the

Guilt

the

is

sentencing

before

it

the

separate

two

were

there

1977

woman.

involves

jury

that

claim

prosecution's

The

in which Smith

in

young

the only question

the

aggravating

a

dangerousness

and

the

other of vileness - the only two aggravating circumstances
specified

in

the

separately with

Virginia

respect

statute.

to each of

The

these,

jury

that

found

it alone

merited imposition of the death penalty.
The case comes to us after
prior

litigation:

Supreme

Court

(i)

of

on

the

Virginia

the usual panoply of

automatic

provided

by

conviction and sentence were affirmed;
in

1979;

corpus,

(iii)
in

on

which

a

state

petitioner

ineffective

assistance

evidentiary

hearing

and

of

court

ruled

state

to

the

law,

the

(ii) we denied cert
petition

claimed

counsel,

appeal

there

the

against

this federal habeas petition was filed

for

court

habeas

had

been

held

petitioner;

an
(iv)

in June 1982, and

..

..•

,

·:...

•'

both

the

magistrate

petitioner's
(v)

CA4

Appeals

claims

affirmed

and

and

the

the

DC

several

no

merit

petition was dismissed;

the decision of

considered

found

the

issues.

and

The Court of

DC.

The

in

trial court had

admitted testimony, at the sentencing phase, by Dr. Pile,
a psychiatrist appointed by
the defendant.

During Dr.

the Court at

the

request of

Pile's examination, petitioner

volunteered statements concerning an earlier rape attempt
that

CA4

characterized

defendant".

At

the

as

time

"severely

of

the

damaging

trial

CA4

to

states

the
that

under Virginia law this testimony was properly admissible.
In any event,

counsel failed to object at trial, and did

not present this issue on appeal to the Virginia Supreme
Court.

This

is

the

basis

for

the claim of

ineffective

assistance of counsel.
The
imposes a

state

relies

on

Wainwright

v.

Sykes

that

burden on the defendant to show cause for and

prejudice in the failure to raise an issue.

CA4 expressed

doubt as to whether or not counsel in fact had been guilty
of

ineffective

assistance,

but

avoided

this

issue

by

deciding the appeal on the authority of Zant v. Stephens,
462

u.s.

862 (1983).

In that case, we stated:

'~

'\

I·

"A death penalty supported by at least one valid
aggravating circumstance need not be set aside .
simply
because
another
aggravated
circumstance is 'invalid' in the sense that it
is insufficient itself to support the death
penalty." ld., at 884.
As

CA4

stated,

the

jury's verdict

imposing

the

death sentence was supported by two separate and distinct
grounds

of

violence)

aggravation:

and

vileness.

(b)

dangerousness

(a)

The

testimony

(i.e.'

of

the

psychiatrist concerned statements by the defendant as to
prior rape or attempted rape.
this case

showed

prior rape,
and

the

the evidence in

that defendant had been convicted of a

had served a

psychiatrist

psychopath

Moreover,

who did

right and wrong.

term in the state penitentiary,

had

not

testified

recognize

that defendant was a

the difference

between

On the basis of all of these facts,

the

jury found that there was a likelihood that the defendant
would continue to commit crimes - i.e. would be dangerous.
The
circumstance

jury

also

specified

found
by

the

second

Virginia

law

aggravating
that

can

be

summarized as a jury finding that the murder at issue was
"outrageously

or

wantonly

vile".

The

Court

of

Appeals

stated:

....

,

.

.
(

..
'

"The evidence presented
showing of 'vileness'
testimony in the guilt
provided a basis for a
was vile."
See,
summary of

p.

164

of

to the jury supporting a
was unchallenged.
The
phase of the case amply
decision that the crime

the

the details of

Joint

Appendix

for

CA4's

No one can doubt

this crime.

that it was "vile".
The
Stephens,

Court

held

improperly

of

that

admitted

Appeals,

even
and

if
that

relying

on

psychiatric
it

may

Zant

evidence

have

v.
was

prejudiced

defendant with respect to the finding of "dangerousness",
the valid circumstance of

the vileness of

the crime was

sufficient itself to support the death penalty.
Subject to the views of my clerk,

1 am inclined

to decide the case on the grounds relied upon by the Court
of Appeals.

The briefs of

the parties -

petitioner and

the state -

as well as the amicus brief of the American

Psychiatric

Association,

are

devoted

primarily

to

the

question involving the admissibility of the incriminating
statements made by the defendant to the psychiatrist.

1

am

a

inclined

to

agree

with

defendant

and

amicus

that

psychiatrist provided by the state at the request of the
defendant should be viewed,

in effect, as a

"consultant"

who

was

duty

bound

not

to divulge

might incriminate the patient.
if

the

testimony

failure

of

question

counsel

before

procedural

should
to

the

default

made

that

The state argues that even

not

have

object

at

Supreme

under

statements

been

trial

Court

Wainwright

admitted,

or

of
v.

to

the

raise

Virginia
Sykes,

the

was

and

a

that

petitioner had shown neither cause nor prejudice.
As
not

noted

deciding

above,

either

1 am inclined

of

these

to

follow CA4

Rather,

issues.

we

assume that defendant is correct as to the TC's
admitting

this

testimony,

and

also

that

it

in
can

error in
may

have

adversely affected petitioner with respect to the finding
of

This

"dangerousness".

independent finding
within

the

leaves

the

separate

that the rape and murder were

meaning

understanding of

still

of

Zant v.

the

Virginia

Stephens,

statute.

this

and

"vile"

Under

my

is sufficient to

sustain the death sentence.
Petitioner's

brief,

apparently

written

very

well - by a professor at u.va. School of Law, argues that
CA4

misconstrued

Zant.

It

is

argued

that

where

constitutional error was committed with respect to one of
more aggravating circumstances, the fact that an otherwise
proper finding of a different factor is not sufficient to

"t

Subject to the views of my

support the death sentence.

clerk, 1 am not persuaded by petitioner's brief.
If my clerk is in accord with the above views, a
very brief memo will suffice.
being

dicta ted

at

horne.

1

do

1

should add that this is

not have

our decision in

Zant v. Stephens and am relying on my recollection as well
as CA4's view of that case.
L.F.P., Jr.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

February 28, 1986

From: Bob
No. 85-5487

MICHAEL MARNELL SMITH v. MURRAY
CAPITAL CASE

To be argued, Tuesday, March 4, 1986

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
When a

court orders a pretrial mental evaluation of a capi-

tal defendant upon defense request to enable counsel to explore
psychiatric defenses or claims in mitigation, is it constitutionally
'--

permissible

testify about

for

the

prosecution

to

call

the

expert

to

incriminating statements made by defendant during

the evaluation when the statements are offered for the 'sole pur-

~

pose of proving an aggravating circumstance and are not 1 relevant
to any claim in mitigation raised by the defense.

Whether the error here was insignificant under this Court's
decision in Zant v. Stephens because another aggravating circumstance was found in this case.

I. BACKGROUND
Petr
1977

for

was

convicted

and

sentenced

to death

on November

the rape and murder of Audrey Weiler on May 23,

3,

1977.

According to petr's confession he met Weiler on a beach near his
home when he stopped to help her remove briars from her feet.
then grasped her arm and walked with her

He

to a wooded area near

the water, pulled out a knife and asked her to take her clothes
off.
Mrs.

She complied, while protesting.
Weiler

and

Smith had intercourse with

then starting choking her with both hands.

He

then dragged her into the water and submerged her head for several

seconds.

knife.

He

subsequently

stabbed

her

in

He left the body and returned home.

the

back with his

The medical examiner

concluded that the immediate cause of death was drowning, though
the stab wounds and strangulation could also have caused death.
Prior

to

trial

petr' s

counsel,

David F.

Pugh,

asked

that

Smith be examined to determine whether he was competent to stand
trial. Later at petr's state habeas hearing, Mr. Pugh stated that
prior to trial he had also wanted assistance of a psychiatrist to
help

him

explore

claims

in exculpation or

mitigation

based on

Smith's mental condition.

This was his desire,

notwithstanding

i

that the trial court's order was apparently limited to t~e competency issue.

(J.A. 128).

After being dissatisfied with the first

evaluation, Pugh requested the court to appoint a private psychiatrist,

Dr. Wendell J. Pile, to examine petr, which it did.

Mr

Pugh had advised petr not to discuss the offense with which he
was charged or any prior offense with anyone but himself and cocounsel. At the outset of the first psychiatric evaluation, a Dr.
Dimi tr is,

also warned petr

that anything he said could be used

against him in a court of law. Dr. Pile said nothing to petr concerning the use that could be made of his statements. In his letter

to court and counsel,

as was

the practice in Virginia,

Dr.

Pile told of an incident related by petr, in which he stated that
some

13

years

earlier

when

he

was

a

teenager,

petr

tore

the

clothes off a girl who rode the school bus he drove before deciding not to rape her.
At the sentencing hearing the prosecution put on four witnesses.
dent.

Dr.

Pile was called to testify to the school bus inci-

Petr's counsel objected,

but the objection was overruled.

At the state habeas hearing, Mr. Pugh testified that he would not
have called Dr. Pile because his testimony would have been hurtful to petr.

Pugh nonetheless cross-examined Dr. Pile and wound

___

--- -------

up eliciting his diagnosis of petr as having a "sociopathic per-

-

sonality, sexual deviation, rape."
~

"---"

......,...,

The prosecution next called

/!ffPt.l.x.5

~~
17}\. '1.-~~

Dr. Dimitris, who testified that petr has an "inadequate person- ~A~
ality disorder."

During Dr. Dimitris' testimony two jurors asked

him to explain the difference between his diagnosis and that of

~.£!-

Dr.

Pile.

Petr's

parole officer

testified

as

to petr's

prior
~

\........

'

rape conviction, and an investigator read petr's confes~ion. The

defense

---

c~ed

prosecutor

relied

-

as well as

only about

both

Dr.

Pile's

In

~

description of

the

school

the

four

..---.....__,_Dr .:~ osis.

bus

hours

The jury deliberated

and returned a death penalty finding

that f3oli..
&Z-f
~~
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute ;r~~

statutory

lfJ

pet ~ould
a

on

witnesses.

------~ .

incJ_d~~t,

for

12 character

aggravating

continuous serious

threat

th~ffense

committing

ble or inhuman,

circumstances:

a

probability

to society and that his conduct in

was outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-

in that it involved torture and aggravated bat-

tery to the victim.
On direct appeal defense counsel did not assign as error the r~~
admission of Dr.

Pile's

testimony,

although

the

cussed in a University of Virginia Amicus brief.

issue was disPetr alleged in

both his state and federal habeas petitions that Dr. Pile's testimony at
missible.
grounds

the

sentencing proceeding was constitutionally imper-

They both ruled that the claim had been forfeited, on

of

procedural

default,

because Mr.

Pugh

had

failed

raise the issue on appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court.
affirmed the federal DC's denial of the writ.

to

The CA4

It assumed without

deciding that petr had demonstrated "cause" and "prejudice," because

it

stance,

found
the

that

other

u.s.

862

invalidating

circumstance

death sentence under
462

even

was

one

aggravating

sufficient

to

circum-

justify

the

this Court's decision in Zant v. Stephens,

(1983).

II. DISCUSSION

~

though able

to show pr judice,

has been unable to show a valid

cause for not raising t is claim on direct appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court.

An affi mance on this basis avoids reaching the

merits on the psychiatric testimony.

I am thoroughly persuaded

that this type of use of a psychiatrist's testimony is unconstitutional.

Finally, a

on the procedural bar point avoids

the issue of whether

finding of one aggravating factor

alone will sustain a

sentence where evidence admitted to

support another factor is e eluded on the basis of the ruling on
appeal.
1. Procedural Bar
In order to avoid the

bar in this case, petr sug-

gests that the "cause and

requirement is somehow de-

serving of a different applicat'on when the petr fails to raise
an

issue

squarely

on

appeal,

rejected

This

in

No.

currently in circulation.
(1984).

argument

84-1554,

which

is
is

See also Reed v. Ross, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1

In addition Murray rejects the claim that mere inadver-

,·_,._

U"-~-

~·

lA.-

tence can suffice to constitute cause, and this Court declined to

~#I

grant

(..~

cert

in

this

case on the

issue of whether petr

ineffective assistance of counsel.

received

Although the representation

here may have been lacking in that the defense was not preserved,
it

is

difficult

to

conclude

that

ineffective assistance of counsel.

that

error

alone

constituted

~7-

~
~irK.

(lJ~~~ ,X-~~?

.&..

~

J

-

-

..

There is little vitality to an argument that the claim here

~

was so novel that there was no reasonable basis in exi'$ting law
to

make

in

it,

light

of

the

fact

that

respondent

argues

so

forcefully that upon doing some research it was virtually impossible not to become aware of the issue.
district court cases
tensive
courts

law
that

review
had

reported

Respondent points to two

in the Criminal Law Reporter, ex-

commentary,

provided

•.

and

to

the

number

of

circuit

protection

in

the

similar

context

in

which a state compels a psychiatric exam. In addition, I noted at
least one

1975 circuit case out of

dressed the issue here.

the CA3

that expressly ad-

There is no doubt that the general sub-

ject of psychiatric testimony against an accused was one widely
considered

by courts with constitutional overtones.

I

conclude

worthy of supporting a

that the claim here is not a

finding that petr had "cause" not to raise it on appeal.

Final-

ly, I do not believe that the fact that the issue was raised before the Virginia Supreme Court in an amicus brief, or the fact ~
that

the state habeas court

in considering

the

ineffective as-

sistance of counsel claim considered it, require a different result.
This is arguably a harsh result because a Virginia Supreme
Court case Gibson v. Commonwealth, 219 S.E.2d 845 (Ca. 1975), had
already rejected, in a similar setting, an argument that use of a
defendant's
Amendment
This
Thus,

was

statements
proscription

so,

it

ruled,

to

a

psychiatrist

against
because

compelling
there

had

violated

the

Fifth

self-incrimination.
been

no

compulsion.

it is not surprising that defense counsel did not see the

J..- -

usefulness of

raising

such a

J--

•

•

claim before the Virgini 1a Supreme
,;

Court.

He should, however, have been aware that the ort+y way to

preserve the claim for later review would be to raise it first.
Within the doctrines

established by this Court,

I

do not see a

way around the procedural bar here.
2. The Psychiatric Testimony
There is no question that amicus American Psychological Association is correct when it asserts plainly that:
"[I]f the defendant is not willing to speak freely
and candidly with the mental health professional, the
professional will frequently be unable to conduct the
type of individualized assessment of the defendant's
mental condition that would be appropriate to the capital sentencing phase."
APA Amicus Brief, at 10.
fendant' s

Sixth Amendment

I am further persuaded that a de-

right

to the

effective assistance of

counsel at trial is denied when counsel cannot consult a psychiatr ist

to

investigate

possible

avenues

of defense without

being

assured that statements made by the defendant in the investigation of those possible areas of defense are not available to the
prosecutor simply by calling the psychiatrist to the stand.
right

could

also

be

supported

by

This

the Fourteenth Amendment,

by

saying that it is fundamentally unfair to deprive a defendant of
a right to defend himself by allowing the prosecution to call to
the stand the psychiatrist consulted by the defendant.

Although

I think either of these grounds support petr here, I lean slightly towards the Sixth Amendment rationale, because the rule sought
by petr can be closely tied to the trial counsel's responsibility

J

3v

to investigate available defenses. See Amicus Brief of N~w Jersey
Department of the Public Advocate, at

ll

'I

Respondent's contrary arguments are just silly.

To say that

it is somehow enough for a defendant to know that statements made
to a psychiatrist can be disclosed, betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the process of psychological evaluation, as pointed out in the

briefs.

The best argument for

respondent's view-

point would be that the need for such a rule does not necessarily
mean

that

there

must

be

a

constitutional

basis

for

it.

Many

states have apparently already regulated the area by statute.
noted above,

however,

I

As

agree that the petr's view is supported

by the constitution.

In

Zan

despite

the

supporting

this Court
fact
the

that

one of

imposition of

the

upheld

a

death

statutory aggravating factors

the death

penalty had

been struck

down by

the Georgia Supreme Court because the factor

provide

an

adequate

basis

for

sentence,

distinguishing

a

failed to

murder

case

in

1 Respondent contends that petr has shifted his theory and that

this court should not consider it.
It is true that petitioner's
earlier submissions, such as in the state habeas proceeding1
focused more on the failure of Dr. Pile to warn petr that what
was said could be used against him, and that the claim was based
on the Fifth Amendment.
In denying his state habeas petition,
however, Judge Carneal considered an analogy to the Sixth
Amendment argument made in the CA4's decision in Gibson v.
Zahradnick, based on an argument that defendant should not have
to sacr1fice his Sixth Amendment right to explore psychological ~
defenses. Assuming the petr could get over the Wainwright \ ~
hurdle, I do not think the Court is barred from considering
whether the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment supports a claim
broader than the mere failure to warn .

..

which the death penalty may be imposed from one in which such a
penalty may not be imposed.

Id., at 886.

This Court

u~held

the

death penalty because one other aggravating factor was found and
because the evidence admitted to support the invalidated factor
was admissible despite the fact that the factor that it tended to
support was invalid.

In making that decision, this Court relied

on certain characteristics of the Georgia sentencing scheme:
"A case may not [become one] in which the death
penalty is authorized unless at least one statutory
"'<
aggravating circumstance is found.
However, this ~ ·
is passed regardless of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is at
least one. Once beyond this ~~ the case enters the
area of the factfinder's discretion, in which all the
facts and circumstances of the case determine, in terms
of our;-::-me t;.aphor, whether or not the case passes the
third ~~~nd into the area in which the death penalty is 1mposed."
Zant,
response

462

u.s.,

at

872

(quoting Georgia Supreme Court

to certified question).

In simple language

the

in

jury

must find one aggravating circumstance; once it does that it re-

-

turns

to a consideration of

the

facts

and evidence to exercise

tC~f

-

i ts discretion whether to impose the death penalty.
The

Virginia

statute

Reply Brief of Petitioner,
case

is

modeled

at 8 n. 9.

is plainly distinguishable

on

the

Georgia

Nonetheless,

from Zant.

statute.

the current

Assuming a

holding

that the psychiatrist's testimony was constitutionally inadmissible,

----------

then, unlike the situation in Zant, the jury was exposed to

--

it
factor,

then,

The

is not that one aggravating circumstance

critical ~-

remains, ~

but rather that the evidence offered to support the second aggravating

circumstance was

..

simply

inadmissible.

Indeed,

in

Zant,

the Georgia Supreme Court noted that "a different result might be

\

reached if the failed circumstance had been supported by ' evidence
not otherwise admissible

.... "

Id.,

This Court later

at 873.

reiterated that same point. Id., at 890.
Because this case is distinguishable from Zant, and because
the admission of the school bus story violated the petr's Sixth
Amendment rights, then the proper analysis of this death convic'--

__.

tion is,

as the petr contends, Chapman harmless error analysis

Whether the error here was harmless is a close call, and
always uncomfortable with in a death case because of the inheren
difficulty at the sentencing phase of knowing whether an
"harmless
claims

beyond

that

a

only

reasonable
because

the

doubt."

In

prosecutor

addition,
called

Dr.

-

petr
Pile,

here
did}

pe ~se~ stu~ble into~gi~~~on w~h
elicited Dr. Pile's diagnosis.
what,

although

am

I

reluctant

That complicates this issue someto

impute

the

defense

error in this regard to the prosecutor.
Respondent contends that the evidence was insignificant when
compared

with

the

other

evidence.

The Commonwealth

introduced

evidence that the petr had previously been convicted of rape in
1973.
paroled

The evidence further established that Petitioner had been
from

months prior
the

the

penitentiary

on

that

charge

less

than

four

to the rape and murder of Mrs. Weiler. Also before

jury was petitioner's confession which contained the state-

ment that he killed the victim because he was afraid of returning
to prison.

In addition, the heinous nature of the crime was be-

fore the jury.

Further, it is doubtful that the jury would have

---?

--·

.1.--·::~ -

been influenced to any great degree by an incident that happened

\

Finally, ~here were

in petr's teen years, some 13 years earlier.
only three

____

-

assing references to the school bus incident in some

....___...__.----..,___.. __...,__

......__

--·~ ·

·-...,

fourteen pages of argument. Thus, according to respondent, it is
easy to find dangerousness even without the school bus incident,
and

thus

the

conviction should be

upheld even under a harmless

error analysis.
Petr contends
sense cumulative.
viction,

the

that the
Rather,

school

bus

information revealed here was in no

in addition to the previous rape conincident

was

introduced

to provide

an

additional factual predicate for the prediction of future dangerousness.

In addition, the prosecutor made reference to it in his

closing

argument.

I

do

not

think

that,

in

light

of

the

- -

other

things going against defendant, there is a reasonable possibility

--------· --

that

the

tainted

--------

'-.

evidence

here

might

have

contributed

--------~~--------~--~~~-

jury's
call,

decision

and for

to

impose

that reason I

a

death

sentence.

This

is

a

_,_

to

the

close

have set out the arguments of both

sides fairly clearly on this point.
III. CONCLUSION
I

~

recommend that you vote to affirm the opinion of the CA4 '

on the ground that petr's claim here is barred by the doctrine of
Wainwright v. Sykes.

In the event the Court chooses to do this,

..._,_,
~-r

announcement of this case should be made on the same day as Mur- /.k4--JA c...
~ v.

Carrier,

supra,

insofar

as

clearly have an impact on this one.

issues

decided

in that case z~r

-

~

In the event the procedural
u,..,_

bar

is not a barrier,

was harmless.

I

recommend you find that the error here
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-5487

MICHAEL MARNELL SMITH, PETITIONER v. EDWARD W. MURRAY, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1986]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether and, if so, under
what circumstances, a prosecutor may elicit testimony from a
mental health professional concerning the content of an interview conducted to explore the possibility of presenting psychiatric defenses at trial. We also agreed to review the
Court of Appeals' determination that any error in the admission of the psychiatrist's evidence in this case was irrelevant
under the holding of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983).
On examination, however, we conclude that petitioner defaulted his underlying constitutional claim by failing to press
it before the Virginia Supreme Court on direct appeal. Accordingly, we decline to address the merits of petitioner's
claims and affirm the judgment dismissing the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
I
Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of the May,
1977 murder of Audrey Weiler. According to his confession,
petitioner encountered Ms. Weiler in a secluded area near his
home and raped her at knifepoint. Fearing that her testimony could send him back to prison, he then grabbed her by
the neck and choked her until she fell unconscious. When he
realized that she was still alive, he dragged her into a nearby
river, submerged her head, and repeatedly stabbed her with

(S -L-L-
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his knife. A subsequent medical examination indicated that
the death was attributable to three clusters of lethal injuries:
asphyxia from strangulation, drowning, and multiple stab
wounds.
Prior to the trial, petitioner's appointed counsel, David
Pugh, had explored the possibility of presenting a number of
psychiatric defenses. Towards that end, Mr. Pugh requested that the trial court appoint a private psychiatrist,
Dr. Wendell Pile, to conduct an examination of petitioner.
Aware that psychiatric reports were routinely forwarded to
the court and that such reports were then admissible under
Virginia law, Mr. Pugh had advised petitioner not to discuss
any prior criminal episodes with anyone. App. 134. See
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 412, 219 S. E. 2d 845
(1975). Although that general advice was intended to apply
to the forthcoming psychiatric examination, Mr. Pugh later
testified that he "did not specifically tell [petitioner] not to
say anything to Doctor Pile about the offense or the offenses." App. 132. During the course of the examination,
Dr. Pile did in fact ask petitioner both about the murder and
about prior incidents of deviant sexual conduct. Tr. of State
Habeas Hearing 19. Although petitioner initially declined to
answer, he later stated that he had once torn the clothes off a
girl on a school bus before deciding not to carry out his original plan to rape her. App. 44. That information, together
with a tentative diagnosis of "Sociopathic Personality; Sexual
Deviation (rape)," was forwarded to the trial court, with
copies sent both to Mr. Pugh and to the prosecutor who was
trying the case for the Commonwealth. I d., at 43-45. At
no point prior to or during the interview did Dr. Pile inform
petitioner that his statements might later be .used against
him or that he had the right to remain silent and to have
counsel present if he so desired. Id., at 90. Cf. Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981).
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the Commonwealth
called Dr. Pile to the stand. Over the defense's objection,

~
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)
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Dr. Pile described the incident on the school bus. Tr.
934-935. On cross examination, he repeated his earlier conclusion that petitioner was a "sociopathic personality." /d.,
at 936. Mter examining a second psychiatrist, the Commonwealth introduced petitioner's criminal record into evidence.
It revealed that he had been convicted of rape in 1973 and
had been paroled from the penitentiary on that charge less
than four months prior to raping and murdering Ms. Weiler.
The defense then called 14 character witnesses, who testified
that petitioner had been a regular church goer, a member of
the choir, a conscientious student in highschool, and a good
soldier in Vietnam. After lengthy deliberation, the jury recommended that petitioner be sentenced to death.
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the
Supreme Court of Virginia. In his brief he raised thirteen
separate claims, including a broad challenge to the constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty provisions, objections to
several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings, and a challenge to the exclusion of a prospective juror during voir dire.
Petitioner did not assign any error concerning the admission
of Dr. Pile's testimony. At a subsequent state post-conviction hearing, Mr. Pugh explained that he had consciously decided not to pursue that claim after determining that "Virginia case law would [not] support our position at that
particular time." App. 143. Various objections to the Commonwealth's use of Dr. Pile's testimony were raised, however, in a brief filed b Amicus Curiae Post-Conviction Assistance Project o the mvers1ty o Virginia Law School.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and
sentence in all respects. vSmith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va.
455, - - S. E. 2d - - (1977). In a footnote, it noted that, )
pursuant to a rule of the court, it had considered only those
arguments advanced by~ Amicus that concerned errors
specifically assigned by the defendant himself. I d., at 460
n. 1,-- S. E. 2d, at--, n. 1. Accordingly, it did not address. any issues concerning the prosecution's use of the psy-

-
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chiatric testimony. This Court denied the subsequent petition for certiorari, which, again, did not urge the claim that
admission of Dr. Pile's testimony violated petitioner's rights
under the Federal Constitution. 441 U. S. 967 (1979).
In 1979, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
Circuit Court for the City of Wil~he County of
James City. For the first time since the trial, he argued that
the admission of Dr. Pile's testimolly'viO'lated his privilege
against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The court ruled,
however, that petitioner had forfeited the claim by failing to
press it in earlier proceedings. At a subsequent evidentiary
hearing, conducted solely on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court heard testimony concerning the
reasons underlying Mr. Pugh's decision not to pursue the
Fifth Amendment claim on appeal. On the basis of that testimony, the court found that Pugh and his assistant had researched the question, but had determined that the claim was
unlikely to succeed. Thus, the court found, "counsel exercised reasonable judgment in deciding not to preserve the objection on appeal, and . . . this decision resulted from informed, professional deliberation." App. to Pet. for Cert.
71. Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition to
the Virginia Supreme Court, contending that the Circuit
Court had erred in finding"his objection to the admission of
Dr. Pile's testimony had been defaulted. The Supreme
Court declined to accept the appeal, 221 Va. cxliii, - - S. E.
2d - - (1981), and we again denied certiorari. 454 U. S.
1128 (1981).
Having exhausted state remedies, petitioner sought a writ
of habeas corpus in .the United States lli§!.rict Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.l n aE_ ~u~o!der, the
court denied the petition, holding t11attheob}eciTont the admission o Dr. 1 e's estlmony was "c~ under
this Court's decision in Wain i ht v
kes, 433 U. S. 72
(1977). App. 158. In reaching that conclusion, the district

85-5487-0PINION
SMITH v. MURRAY

5

judge noted that "the default resulted not from the trial attorney's ignorance or inadvertance, but because of a deliberate tactical decision." I d.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but
on different grounds. Smith v. Procunier, 769 F. 2d 170
(1985). Finding it unnecessary to rely on procedural default
or to address the merits of the substantive constitutional
claim, the court held that admission of Dr. Pile's testimony,
even if erroneous, could not be the basis for invalidating petitioner's sentence. It noted that the jury had relied on two distinct aggravating factors in its decision to recommend the
death penalty. The psychiatric testimony, however, only
bore on one of those factors, the likelihood that petitioner
would "constitute a continuing serious threat to society."
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Tr. at 1102.
In that circumstance, the Court of Appeals believed, our decision in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 884 (1982) required
the conclusion that the error, if any, was irrelevant to the
overall validity of the sentence. We granted certiorari, - U. S. - - (1985), and now af
the authority of our decision in Murray v. Carrie , ante,
~

II

Under Virginia law, failure to raise a claim on direct appeal
from a criminal conviction ordinarily bars consideration of
that claim in any subsequent state proceeding. See, e. g.,
Coppola v. Warden of the Virginia State Penitentiary, - Va. - - , 282 S. E. 2d 10 (1981); Slayton v. Parrigan, 215
Va. 25, 205 S. E. 2d 680 (1974). In the present case, the
Virginia courts have enforced that rule by declining to consider petitioner's objection to the admission of Dr. Pile's testimony, a claim concededly not included in his initial appeal
from his conviction and sentence. Consistent with our earlier intimations in Reed ~·
R
468 U. S. - - , - - , we
held in Murray v. Carrier, upra, at a federal habeas court
must evaluate appellate
s under the same standards

I

:

f
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"[D]efense counsel may not make a tactical decision to
forgo a procedural opportunity-for instance, to object
at trial or to raise an issue on appeal-and then when he
discovers that the tactic has been unsuccessful, pursue
an alternative strategy in federal court. The encouragement of such conduct by a federal court on habeas
corpus review would not only offend generally accepted
principles of comity, but would undermine the accuracy
and efficiency of the state judicial system to the detri-

~

'l

I·
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ment of all concerned. Procedural defaults of this nature are, therefore, inexcusable, and cannot qualify as
'cause' for purposes of federal habeas corpus review."
468 U. S., at - - (internal quotations and citations
omitted)."
Here the record unambiguously reveals that petitioner's
counsel ob"ecte o the a misswn of r. i e s testimony at -1-~ ~
trial and then conscious e ected not to pursue t at claim bethe Virgm1a upreme Court.
e asis for that deci- ~
sion was counsel's perception that the claim had little chance
of success in the Virginia courts. With the benefit of hindsight, petitioner's counsel in this Court now contends that
this perception proved to be incorrect. Cf. Gibson v.
Zahradnick, 581 F. 2d 75 (CA4 1978) (repudiating reasoning
of Gibson v. Commonwealth, supra). Even assuming that
to be the case, however, a state's subsequent acceptance of
an argument deliberately abandoned on direct appeal is irrelevant to the question whether the default should be excused
on federal habeas. Indeed, it is the very prospect that a
state court "may decide, on reflection, that the contention is
valid" that undergirds the established rule that "perceived
futility alone cannot constitute cause," Engle v. Isaac, 456
U. S. 107, 130 & 130 n. 36 (1982); for "[a]llowing criminal defendants to deprive the state courts of [the] opportunity" to
reconsider previously rejected constitutional claims is fundamentally at odds with the principles of comity that animate
Sykes and its progeny. !d., at 130.
Notwithstanding the deliberate nature of the decision not
to pursue his objection to Dr. Pile's testimony on appeal-a
course of conduct virtually fatal to any effort to satisfy Syke's
"cause" .r equirement-petitioner contends that the default
should be excused because Mr. Pugh's decision, though deliberate, was made in ignorance. Had he investigated the
claim more fully, petitioner maintains, "it is inconceivable
that he would have concluded that the claim was without

fore

~
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merit or that he would have failed to raise it." Reply Brief
for Petitioner 3.
The argument is squarely foreclosed by our decision in )
Carrier, which holds that "the mere fact that counsel faile to
recognize the factual or lega asis for a clmm, or failed to
ra
c ·
esp1 e re
1z1 g 1t, do~stitute
cau~r ~:.Jn~ea_gr~a_e u t.
Ante, at - - . See also
Engle vTsaclc, supra, 45"6 U. S., at 133-34. Nor can it seriously be maintained that the decision not to press the claim
on appeal was an error of such magnitude that it rendered
counsel's performance constitutionally deficient under the
test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).
Carrier reaffirmed that "the right to effective assistance of
counsel . . . may in a particular case be violated by even an
isolated error . . . if that error is sufficiently egregious and
prejudicial." Ante, at - - ; see also United States v.
Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 657, n. 20 (1984). But counsel's deliberate decision not to pursue his objection to the admission of
Dr. Piles' testimony falls far short of meeting that rigorous
standard. After conducting a vigorous defense at both the
guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, counsel surveyed the
extensive transcript, researched a number of claims, and decided that, under the current state of the law, thirteen were
worth pursuing on direct appeal. This process of "winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on" those
more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1983). It will often be the
case that even the most informed counsel will fail to anticipate a state appellate court's willingness to reconsider a prior
holding or will underestimate the likelihood that a federal habeas court will repudiate an established state rule. But, as
Strickland v. Washington made clear, "[a] fair assessment of
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to

'

''I
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evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."
466 U. S., at 689. Viewed in light of Virginia law at the time
Mr. Pugh submitted his opening brief to the Virginia
Supreme Court, the decision not to pursue his objection to
the admission of Dr. Piles' testimony fell well within the
"wide range of professionally competent assistance" required
under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
ld., at 690.
Nor can petitioner rely on the novelty of his legal claim as
"cause" for noncompliance with Virginia's rules. See Reed
v. Ross, supra, at--, ("[W]here a constitutional claim is so
novel that its legal basis is not available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance
with applicable state procedures.") Petitioner contends that
this Court's decisions in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454
(1981), and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. (1985), which
were decided well after the affirmance of his conviction and
sentence on direct appeal, lend support to his position that
Dr. Pile's testimony should have been excluded. But as a
comparison of Reed and Engle makes plain, the question is
not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel's task easier, but whether at the time of the default the
claim was "available" at all. As petitioner has candidly conceded, various forms of the claim he now advances had been
percolating in the lower courts for years at the time of his
original appeal. Brieffor Petitioner 20-21 n. 12; Reply Brief
for Petitioner 3. Moreover, in this very case, an Amicus before the Virginia Supreme Court specifically argued that admission of Dr. Pile's testimony violated petitioner's rights
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Brief for Post Conviction Assistance Project of the University of Virginia Law
School as Amicus Curiae 53-62. Under these circumstances, it simply is not open to argue that the legal basis of
the claim petitioner now presses on federal habeas was unavailable to counsel at the time of the direct appeal.
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We conclude, therefore, that petitioner has not carried his
burden of showing cause for noncompliance with Virginia's
rules of procedure. That determination, however, does not
end our inquiry. As wenute<tillEngle a~ed in
Ca~n appropriate cases' the principles comity and
finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundame~lly unjy_st
incarceration."' Murray v. Carrier, ante, at--, quoting
E~saac, 456 U.S., at 135. Accordingly, "where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ even Intlie aosence of a showing of cause
for the procedural default." Murray v. Carrier, ante, at

or

We acknowledge that the concept of "actual," as distinct
from "legal," innocence does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a
capital offense. Nonetheless, we think it clear on this record
that application of the cause and prejudice test will not result
in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Engle, supra, at
135. There is no allegation that the testimony about the
school bus incident was false or in any way misleading. Nor
can it be argued that the prospect that Dr. Pile might later
testify against him had the effect of foreclosing meaningful
exploration of psychiatric defenses. While that concern is a
very real one in the abstract, here the record clearly shows
that Dr. Pile did ask petitioner to discuss the crime he stood
accused of committmg as well as prior incidents of deviant
sexual conduct. Although initially reluctant to do so, ultimately petitioner was forthcoming on both subjects. In
short, the alle ed constitutional error neither recluded the
development of true facts nor resulted in the admission of
false
ones. Thus, even assuming t at, as a legal matter, Dr.
.._____
Pile's testimony should not have been presented to the jury,
its admission did not serve to pervert the jury's deliberations
or otherwise deflect their attention from the ultimate ques-

vr---
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tion whether in fact petitioner constituted a continuing
threat to society. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that refusal to consider the defaulted claim on federal
habeas carries with it the risk of a manifest miscarriage of
~ ustice.
.
~ Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap1'(,
peals upholding the dismissal of petitioner's application for a
'
writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-5487
"
MICHAEL
MARNELL SMITH, PETITIONER v. EDWARD W. MURRAY, DIRECTOR, VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE NITED S ATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE F URTH CIR UIT
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The record in this case unquestionably demonstrates that
petitioner's constitutional claim is meritorious, and that there
is a significant risk that he will be put to death because his
constitutional rights were violated.
The Court does not take issue with this conclusion. It is
willing to assume that (1) petitioner's Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination was violated; (2) his
Eighth Amendment right to a fair, constitutionally sound
sentencing proceeding was violated by the introduction of the
evidence from that Fifth Amendment violation; and (3) those
constitutional :violations made the difference between life and
death in the jury's consideration of his fate. Although the
constitutional violations and issues were sufficiently serious
that this Court decided to grant certiorari, and although the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided the issue on
the merits, this Court concludes that petitioner's presumably
meritorious constitutional claim is procedurally barred and
that petitioner must therefore be executed.
In my opinion, the Court should reach the merits of petitioner's argument. To the extent that there has been a procedural "default," it is exceedingly minor. Petitioner's counsel raised a timely objection to the introduction of the
evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. A

- '.
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respected friend of the Court-the University of Virginia
Law School's Post-Conviction Assistance Project-brought
the issue to the attention of the Virginia Supreme Court in an
extensive amicus curiae brief. Smith's counsel also raised
the issue in state and federal habeas corpus proceedings, and,
as noted, the Court of Appeals decided the case on the merits. Consistent with the well-established principle that appellate arguments should be carefully winnowed,t however,
Smith's counsel did not raise the Fifth Amendment issue in
his original appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court-an unsurprising decision in view of the fact that a governing Virginia Supreme Court precedent, which was then entirely
valid and only two years old, decisively barred the claim. 2
Nevertheless, the Court terms the lawyer's decision not to
include the constitutional claim "virtually fatal" to Smith's
position, ante, at 7-an unfortunately apt description in light
of the Court's disposition. The Court offers the remarkable
explanation that "[u]nder these circumstances"-in which petitioner's death penalty will stand despite serious Fifth and
Eighth Amendment violations that played a critical role in
the determination that death is an appropriate penalty-"we
do not believe that refusal to consider the defaulted claim in
federal habeas corpus carries with it the risk of a manifest
miscarriage of justice." Ante, at 11.
I fear that the Court has lost its way in a procedural maze
of its own creation and that it has grossly misevaluated the
requirements of "law and justice" that are the federal court's
statutory mission under the federal habeas corpus statute. 3
To understand the nature of the Court's error, it is necessary
to assess the Court's conclusion that the claim is procedurally
defaulted; to consider the Fifth Amendment violation; and to
consider the Eighth Amendment violation.
1
See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751-752 (1983); ante, at 8.
' See Gibson v. Commonwealth, 219 S. E. 2d 845 (Va. 1975).
3
See 28 U. S. C. § 2243 ("The court shall ... dispose of the matter as
law and justice require").
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We begin with the common ground. The historic office of
the Great Writ as the ultimate protection against fundamental unfairness is well-known. 4 That mission is reflected
in the statutory requirement that the federal court "dispose
of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C.
§ 2243. It is by now equally clear that the application of the
Court's "cause and prejudice" formulation as a rigid bar toreview of fundamental constitutional violations has no support
in the statute, or in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12
(b)(2), from which it was initially imported; 5 the standard
thus represents judicial lawmaking of the most unabashed
form. The Court nonetheless reaffirms today, as it has consistently held in the past, 6 that federal courts retain the
power to entertain federal habeas corpus requests despite the
absence of "cause and prejudice," ante, at 10; the only question is whether to exercise that power. Despite the rigor of
its cause and prejudice standard, moreover, the Court continues to commit itself to maintaining the availability of habeas
corpus under certain circumstances, even in the absence of
"cause," ibid ; indeed, this Term, the Court has emphasized
the importance of that availability by remanding a case to
consider the merits of a prisoner's claim even though the prisoner failed to show "cause" for the default. Murray v. Carrier, --U. 8.-- (1986) .
. 'See, e. g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126 (1982) ("The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored position in our jurisprudence .
. . . Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a bulwark against convictions
that violate 'fundamental fairness'").
5
See Murray v. Carrier,- u . s . - , - (1986) (STEVENS, J.,
concurring in judgment) (slip op. 5-9). Indeed, the Court in Murray conceded that "[t]he cause and prejudice test may lack a perfect historical pedigree," Murray, a t - (slip op. 16), and noted that "the Court acknowledged as much in Wainwright v. Sykes." Ibid.
•see, e. g., Reed v. Ross , 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984); Francis v. Henderson ,
425 U. S. 536, 538 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 392, 309-399 (1963).
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The Court concludes in this case that no miscarriage of justice will result from a refusal to entertain Smith's challenge
to his death sentence. This conclusion is flawed in three respects. First, the Court mistakenly assumes that only a
claim implicating "actual innocence" rises to the level of a
miscarriage of justice. Second, the Court does not properly
assess the force of a claim that a death penalty is invalid. Finally, the Court vastly exaggerates the State interest in refusing to entertain this claim.
The Court accurately quotes the holding in Murray v. Carrier: "'[W]here a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a
showing of cause for the procedural default."' Ante, at 10.
The Court then seeks to transfer this "actual innocence"
standard to capital sentencing proceedings, and concludes
that, in petitioner's sentencing hearing, "the alleged constitutional error neither precluded the development of true facts
nor resulted in the admission of false ones." Ibid. The
Court does not explain, however, why Carrier's clearly correct holding about the propriety of the writ in a case of innocence must also be a limiting principle on the federal court's
ability to exercise its statutory authority to entertain federal
habeas corpus actions; more specifically, the Court does not
explain why the same principle should not apply when a constitutional violation is claimed to have resulted in a lack of
fundamental fairness, either in a conviction or in a death
sentence.
This analysis is far removed from the traditional understanding of habeas corpus. For instance, in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), the Court considered a claim that
the murder convictions and death sentences of five black defendants were unconstitutional. The federal District Court
had dismissed the writ of habeas corpus. In his opinion for
the Court, Justice Holmes explained that in view of the allegations-systematic ex<;lusion of blacks from the jury and
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threatened mob violence-the federal District Court should
not have dismissed the writ without considering the factual
allegations. The Court noted the presence of a clear procedural default-the Arkansas Supreme Court had refused to
entertain the challenge to discrimination in the jury because
the objection "came too late." !d., at 91. The Court nevertheless held that the federal District Court should have entertained the petition. I d., at 92.
Although the allegations clearly implicated questions about
the accuracy of the truth-finding process, the Court's opinion
cannot be fairly read to rest on the kind of "innocence" inquiry that the Court propounds today. For the Court specifically rejected the notion that its inquiry into the presence
of a serious constitutional violation was actually an inquiry
into the guilt or innocence of the petitioners: "The petitioners
say that [the victim] must have been killed by other whites
[rather than by the black petitioners], but that we leave to
one side as what we have to deal with is not the petitioners'
innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved." 261 U. S., at 87-88
(emphasis added). Today, the Court adopts the converse of
Justice Holmes's proposition: it leaves to one side the question whether constitutional rights have been preserved, and
considers only the petitioner's innocence or guilt. 7
The majority's reformulation of the traditional understanding of habeas corpus appears to be premised on the notion
7
In doing so, the Court goes a long way toward eliminating the distinction, in procedural default cases, between the request for habeas relief and
the ultimate issue for a trial court-a distinction that has long been central
to our understanding of the Great Writ. See, e. g., Ex Parte Bollman, 4
Cranch 75, 101 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) ("It has been demonstrated at the
bar, that the question brought forward on a habeas corpus, is always distinct from that which is involved in the cause itself. The question whether
the individual shall be imprisoned is always distinct from the question
whether he shall be convicted or acquitted of the charge on which he is to
be tried, and therefore these questions are separated, and may be decided
in different courts").
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that only constitutional violations which go to guilt or innocence are sufficiently serious to implicate the "fundamental
fairness" alluded in Engle v. Isaac. 8 If accuracy in the
determination of guilt or innocence were the only value of our
criminal justice system, then the Court's analysis might have
a great deal of force. If accuracy is the only value, however,
then many of our constitutional protections-such as the
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
and the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment, the very claims asserted by petitioner-are not
only irrelevant, but possibly counter-productive. 9 Our Constitution, however, and our decision to adopt an "accusatorial," rather than an "inquisitorial" system of justice, 10 reflects a different choice. That choice is to afford the
individual certain protections-the right against compelled
self-incrimination and the right against cruel and unusual
punishment among them-even if those rights do not necessarily implicate the accuracy of the truth-finding proceedings. Rather, those protections are an aspect of the fundamental fairness, liberty, and individual dignity that our
society affords to all, even those charged with heinous
crimes.
8

See n. 4, supra.
Expressing this view, William Howard Taft once observed that, precisely because of the central value of accuracy in guilt or innocence determinations, the Fifth Amendment might have been ill-advised. See Taft,
The Administration of Criminal Law, 15 Yale L. J. 1, 8 (1905) ("When examined as an original proposition, the prohibition that the defendant in a
criminal case shall not be compelled to testify seems, in some aspects, to be
of doubtful utility. If the administration of criminal law is for the purpose
of convicting those who are guilty of crime, then it seems natural to follow
in such a process the methods that obtain in ordinary life").
10
See Moran v. Burbine, - - U. S. - - , - - (1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (slip op. 1-2 and n. 1); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. --,--(slip
op. 5) (1985); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, 540-541 (1961); Bram v. United States, 168 U. S.
532, 543-545 (1897).
9

'
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In my opinion, then, the Court's exaltation of accuracy as
the only characteristic of "fundamental fairness" is deeply
flawed. Our criminal justice system, and our Constitution,
protects other values in addition to the reliability of the guilt
or innocence determination, and the statutory duty to serve
"law and justice" should similarly reflect those values.
Thus, the Court begins with a conception of "fundamental
fairness" that is far too narrow and that conflicts with the nature of our criminal justice system. The Court similarly fails
to give appropriate weight to the fact that capital punishment
is at stake in this case. It is now well settled that "death is a
different kind of punishment from any other which may be
imposed in this country." Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S.
349, 357 (1977) (STEVENS, J .). 11 It is of vital importance to
See also California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 998-999 (1983) ("The
Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the
capital sentencing determination"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 884
(1983) ("(T]here is a qualitative difference between death and any other
permissible form of punishment"); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 272
(1980) ("This theme, the unique nature of the death penalty for purposes of
Eighth Amendment analysis, has been repeated time and again in our opinions. . . . (A] sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978) (BURGER, C. J.)
("[T]he imposition of death by public authority is ... profoundly different
from all other procedures"). Cf. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1222 (1986) ("[W]hen a capital defendant raises a nonfrivolous constitutional question, neither state nor federal
courts should be free to refuse to decide it simply because it was not raised
in accordance with state procedural requirements. Rather, federal law
should expressly provide that in matters of procedural defaults, as in other
matters, death is different").
Indeed, the Court has recognized that even the threat of a death penalty
may, in certain circumstances, exert a special pull in favor of the exercise
of the federal court's undisputed statutory power to entertain a habeas corpus writ on a claim that was procedurally defaulted. In Fay v. Noia, 372
U. S. 391, 440 (1963), the Court was willing to excuse Noia's deliberate decision not to appeal because Noia perceived that a death sentence might
11
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the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, the consequence of scrupulously fair procedures. When a condemned
prisoner raises a substantial, colorable Eighth Amendment
violation, there is a special obligation, consistent with the
statutory mission to "dispose of the matter as law and justice
require," to consider whether the prisoner's claim would render his sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. Indeed, it was precisely this concern that prompted the Court
of Appeals to consider petitioner's argument on the merits:
"[W]e give weight to the consideration that we have before
us a matter of life and death. The imminent execution of
Smith serves as sufficient grounds to review the issue." 769
F. 2d 170, 172.
Finally, as in every habeas corpus decision, the magnitude
of the State's interest must be considered. In this case, several factors suggest that the State's interest is not adequate
to obstruct federal habeas corpus consideration of petitioner's
claim. First, petitioner made a timely objection at trial, and
the State interest in enforcing procedural default rules at
trial is far greater than the State's interest in enforcing procedural default rules on appeal. 12 Second, the issue was
raised before the State in an amicus curiae brief. 13 Since this
is a matter on which courts ordinarily may exercise discreresult: "His was the grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might
well have led to a retrial and death sentence." See also Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 83 (1977) (emphasizing Noia's "'grisly choice' between
acceptance of his life sentence and pursuit of an appeal which might culminate in a sentence of death").
12
See Murray v. Carrier, --U.S. - - , - - (1986) (STEVENS, J.,
concurring in judgment); Meltzer, 99 Harv. L. Rev., at 1223-1225; Note,
Procedural Defaults at the Appellate Stage and Federal Habeas Corpus
Review, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 463 (1986).
13
See Brief for University of Virginia Law School Post-Conviction
Assistance Project as Amicus Curiae, 56-61 (arguing that the Fifth
Amendment required suppression of psychiatrist's testimony).
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tion, 14 the discretionary decision not to address the issue
hardly rises to a State interest of sufficient magnitude that a
man should die even though his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights were violated to achieve that objective. Third,
the issue was presented to the State courts in state habeas
proceedings-after the precedent blocking petitioner's claim
had been repudiated 15-and the State habeas court, while
finding that the decision by Smith's counsel not to raise the
issue with a governing Virginia precedent squarely against
him was entirely reasonable, 16 concluded that the Fifth
Amendment claim was procedurally barred and thus did not
address it. 17 Fourth, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit addressed the merits and did not rest on any notion of
procedural default; this Court customarily defers to federal
Courts of Appeals on questions of State law, 18 including ques14
Cf. Schwinden v. Burlington Northern, 691 P. 2d 1351, (Mont. 1984)
("We determine here not to follow the usual rule that issues raised by amici
that are part of the underlying action will not be considered by this
Court").
16
See Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F. 2d 75 (CA4 1978) (holding that the
Gibson v. Commonwealth analysis violates Constitution and that writ of
habeas corpus should issue). In fact, although the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit decided Gibson after the briefs in petioner's case had
been filed, the Gibson opinion was issued before the initial Virginia
Supreme Court opinion refusing to address the issue.
16
See State Habeas opinion, App. 147 ("[B]oth Gibson v. Zahradnick and
Smith v. Estelle were decided after petitioner's trial. Thus, regardless of
their usefulness in theory to sustain an appeal, neither was in fact available
to counsel when needed .... In light of these facts and of the differences
noted above, I find sufficient reason for counsel not to have raised on appeal the arguments presented here. I thus conclude that counsel exercised reasonable judgment in deciding not to preserve the objection on
appeal").
17
State Habeas order, Record 204 (Fifth Amendment issue "was waived
and forfeited and cannot now be considered").
8
' See, e. g., Pembaur v. Cincinnatti, - - U . S . - - , - - (1986) (slip
op. 14 n. 13); Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,-- U.S.
- - , - - , n. 10 (1985) (slip op. 10, n. 10); United States v. S. A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U. S. 797, 815, n. 12 (1984); Bishop v.
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tions about "cause" for failure to comply with State procedural rules. 19 Finally, and most importantly, the inadequacy
of the State interest in this death penalty context is decisively shown by the prevailing practice in many States that
appellate courts have a special duty in capital cases to overlook procedural defaults and review the trial record for reversible error, before affirming that most severe of all
sentences. 20
Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-347 (1976); Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472,
486-487 (1949).
19
See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 234 n. 1 (1980) ("The applicability of the Sykes 'cause'-and-'prejudice' test may turn on an interpretation of state law .... This Court's resolution of such a state-law question
would be aided significantly by views of other federal courts that may possess greater familiarity with [state] law"); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S.
263, 267 n. 7 (1980) ("Deferring to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of
Texas law, we decline to hold that Wainwright bars Rummel from presenting his claim").
20
See, e. g., Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(k) ("In all cases in
which the death penalty has been imposed, ... the Supreme Court may
notice any plain error or defect in the proceeding under review, whether or
not brought to the attention of the trial court and take appropriate action
by reason thereof, whenever such error has, or probably has, adversely affected the substantial rights of the petitioner"); Arkansas Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 43-2725 ("where either a sentence for life imprisonment or death [is
present], the Supreme Court shall review all errors prejudicial to the
rights of the appellant"); Cave v. Florida, 476 So. 2d 180, 183 n.1 (1985) (In
capital cases, "[w]e will, of course, continue to review every issue presented and to conduct our own review in accordance with Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.140(f)"); Georgia Unified Appeal Rule B(2) (In capital cases, "[t]he Supreme Court shall review each of the assertions of error
timely raised by the defendant during the proceedings in the trial court regardless of whether or not an assertion of error was presented to the trial
court by motion for new trial, and regardless of whether error is enumerated in the Supreme Court"); State v. Osborn, 631 P. 2d 187, 192-193 (Ida.
1981) ("Death is clearly a different kind of punishment from any other that
might be imposed, and [Idaho Code] § 19-2827 mandates that we examine
not only the sentence but the procedure followed in imposing that sentence
regardless of whether an appeal is even taken. This indicates that we may
not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the gravity of a sentence of
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Thus, the Court is mistaken in its narrow definition of fundamental fairness, in its failure to appreciate the significance
of a challenge to a death penalty, and in its exaggeration of
the State's interest in refusing to entertain a claim that was
death and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweigh any rationale
that might be proposed to justify refusal to consider errors not objected to
below"); People v. Holman, --Ill. - -, - - , 469 N. E. 2d 119, 140
(1984) ("Ordinarily, a contention not made in the trial court is waived on
appeal. ... However, because of the qualitative difference between death
and other forms of punishment ... this court has elected to address errors
in death penalty cases which might have affected the decision of the sentencing jury"); Lowery v. State, 478 N. E. 2d 1214, 1229 (Ind. 1985) ("The
failure to properly raise issues in the Motion to Correct Errors generally
results in a waiver of the claimed errors .... Since the death penalty was
imposed in this case, however, we will review the state of the record concerning these questions"); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S. W. 2d 671, 675
(Ky. 1984) ("[l]n a death penalty case every prejudicial error must be considered, whether or not an objection was made in the trial court"); State v.
Hamilton, 478 So. 2d 123, 127 n. 7 (La. 1985) ("In death penalty cases, this
court has reviewed assignments of error, despite the absence of a contemporaneous objection, in order to determine whether the error 'render[ed]
the result unreliable,' thus avoiding later consideration of the error in the
context of ineffective assistance of counsel"); State v. Nave, 694 S. W. 2d
729, 738 (Mo. 1985) ("Several states hold that the general rule that allegations of court error not assigned in a motion for new trial are not preserved
for appellate review, codified in Missouri Rule 29.11(d) with exceptions not
applicable here, is inapplicable in death penalty cases. Even though the
assignment of error has been improperly preserved, we review, ex gratia,
the point relied on for plain error . .. to determine if manifest injustice or a
miscarriage of justice resulted from the denial of Nave's request for continuance"); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A. 2d 174,
180-181 (1978) ("Because imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in
its finality, it is imperative that the standards by which that sentence is
fixed be constitutionally beyond reproach .... The waiver rule cannot be
exalted to a position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the
real issue-the propriety of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution"); State v. Patterson, 295 S. E. 2d 264, 264-165 (S.C. 1982) ("On appeal from a murder conviction in which the death penalty is imposed, this
Court will review the entire record for prejudicial error in favorem vitae,
regardless of whether the error was properly preserved for review"); State
v. Brown, 607 P. 2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980) ("[N]o objection was made to the
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raised at trial, on appeal by an amicus, and in state habeas
proceedings; that was addressed on the merits by the Court
of Appeals (and briefed and argued on the merits in this
Court); and that must be assumed to make the difference between life and death. Because I disagree with the Court's
evaluation of these matters, I would address the merits of petitioner's argument that constitutional violations render his
sentence of death fundamentally unfair.
II
The introduction of petitioner's comments to the court-appointed psychiatrist clearly violated the Fifth Amendment.
As the majority points out, psychiatric reports by court-appointed psychiatrists "were routinely forwarded to the court
... and were then admissible under Virginia law." Ante, at
2. However, "[a]t no point prior to or during the interview
did Dr. Pile inform petitioner that his statements might later
be used against him or that he had the right to remain silent
and to have counsel present if he so desired." Ante, at 2.
Moreover, the court-appointed psychiatrist related petitioner's description of an earlier sexual assault in a letter to the
court and to the prosecution, as well as to the defense, and
testified about the description, at the State's request, at petitioner's capital sentencing hearing. The State thus relied on
Dr. Pile's testimony as evidence of "future dangerousness,"
one of the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury
to justify a sentence of death. 21
omission. Nevertheless, as this is a capital case, we consider the defendant's contention on appeal").
Indeed, Virginia law itself recognizes the special obligations attendant
on reviewing death penalties by providing for automatic Virginia Supreme
Court review of the death penalty, § 17-110.1A, and giving capital cases
priority on the Court's docket, § 17-110.2. Some State Supreme Courts
interpret such statutes to impose an obligation on the Court to review the
transcript for all possible errors. See, e. g., State v. Osborn, supra.
21
See Prosecutor's Closing Argument at Sentencing Phase, App. 30-31
("Now, as I said, you all, the Court has instructed you that you all may fix
his punishment at death, if the Commonwealth proved its case-proved the
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CHIEF JusTICE BURGER's opinion for the Court in Estelle
v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), makes it absolutely clear that
the introduction of this evidence by the prosecution at the
sentencing stage violated the Fifth Amendment. As THE
CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the Fifth Amendment fully applies
to a capital sentencing proceeding: "Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made "'the
deluded instrument of his own conviction,"" Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U. S. [568,] 581, quoting 2 Hawkins, Pleas
of the Crown 595 (8th ed. 1824), it protects him as well from
being made 'the deluded instrument' of his own execution."
451 U. S., at 454. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE also explained,
prosecutorial use of evidence from a psychiatric interrogation
in a capital sentencing proceeding requires the protections,
and warnings, accorded the Fifth Amendment right in other
contexts: "Because [the defendant] did not voluntarily consent to the pretrial psychiatric examination after being informed of his right to remain silent and the possible use of his
statements, the State could not rely on what he said to [the
psychiatrist] to establish his future dangerousness." 451
U. S., at 468.
Thus, the use of petitioner's statements clearly violated the
Fifth Amendment. 22 In view of the majority's willingness to
assume that the constitutional violation is present but that
the failure to address it does not affect the fundamental fairness of petitioner's sentence, moreover, it is instructive torecall the importance of the Fifth Amendment right at issue.
prior history that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuous serious threat to society, Now, what has the Commonwealth proved? The Commonwealth has proved that prior to the crime
you all convicted him of yesterday, that he assaulted a person on the bus.
He said he did it .... Tore her clothes off, and then decided not to do it").
22
The state trial court's rejection of petitioner's trial objection to the psychiatrist's testimony stands in sharp contrast to THE CHIEF JUSTICE's Estelle analysis: "I don't believe that Doctor Pile has any duty to inform him
that anything he may say to him may be used for or against him in a Court
of Law, as a police officer does under the Miranda." App. 5.
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Again, THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion in Estelle v. Smith provides guidance:
"Miranda held that 'the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.'
... The purpose of these admonitions is to combat what
the Court saw as 'inherently compelling pressures' at
work on the person and to provide him with an awareness of the Fifth Amendment privilege and the consequences of foregoing it, which is the prerequisite for 'an
intelligent decision as to its exercise.' ...
"The Fifth Amendment privilege is 'as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard,' Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 542, 562 (1892), and the privilege is
fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed
the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in
the unfettered exercise of his own will and to suffer no
penalty . . . for such silence.' Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U. S. at 81 (1964)."
Given the historic importance of the Fifth Amendment,
and the fact that the violation of this right made a significant
difference in the jury's evaluation of petitioner's "future dangerousness" (and consequent death sentence), it is not only
proper, but imperative, that the federal courts entertain petitioner's entirely meritorious argument that the introduction
of the psychiatrist's testimony at his sentencing hearing violated that fundamental protection. 23
The State argues that petitioner's case is distinguishable from Estelle
because the defense requested the psychiatric examination. In view of
the fact that Dr. Pile related the account to the prosecution and the court,
and testified for the prosecution, he was quite clearly an "agent of the
State" in the same sense in which the psychiatrist in Estelle was an agent
of the State. See 451 U. S., at 467 ("When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court on .the issue of competence and testified for the
23
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III
It is also quite clear that the introduction of the evidence
violated his Eighth Amendment right to a fair sentencing
proceeding. In this respect, I disagree with the Court of
Appeals' reading of the opinion that I authored for the Court
in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983). The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the jury also found an aggravating circumstance of "vileness," the death sentence
could stand even if Dr. Pile's testimony represented a flagrant Fifth Amendment violation.
In Zant, we held that the Georgia Supreme Court's invalidation of one of the three aggravating circumstances found
by the jury did not require that the death penalty be set
aside. But that conclusion was reached only after we satisfied ourselves that the evidence relating to the invalid aggravating circumstance had been properly admitted. 24 We
prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future
dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like that of an
agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest
custodial setting").
Petitioner and amici, in tum, argue that, because the examination was to
assist the defense, an absolute guarantee of confidentiality, rather than
Miranda warnings, should have been required. They contend that such
confidentiality is especially important to effectuate the Due Process right
to consult with a psychiatrist that was recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma,
- - U. S. - - (1985). Since, at a minimum, Estelle required that Dr.
Pile give Miranda warnings, we need not consider the possiblity that disclosure would have been inappropriate in any circumstances. For it is at
least clear that, under these circumstances, his testimony violated petitioner's Fifth Amendment right.
24
"But the invalid aggravating circumstances found by the jury in this
case was struck down in Arnold because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that it fails to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder
case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which
such a penalty may not be imposed. See nn. 5 and 16, supra. The underlying evidence is nevetheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase. . . ."
"Thus, any evidence on which the jury might have relied in this case to
find that respondent had previously been convicted of a substantial number

)I'

I·

85-5487-DISSENT

16

SMITH v. MURRAY

did not conclude, as the Court of Appeals seems to have assumed, that any evidence concerning the invalid circumstance was simply irrelevant because the valid circumstances
were, in all events, sufficient to support the death penalty.
The fact that the record adequately establishes one valid aggravating circumstance may make the defendant eligible for
the death penalty but it does not justify the conclusion that a
death sentence should stand even though highly prejudicial
inadmissible evidence was presented to the jury at the sentencing hearing. The introduction of such highly prejudicial,
inadmissible evidence-evidence that itself represents an independent constitutional violation-quite clearly undermines
the validity of the capital sentencing proceeding and violates
the Eighth Amendment.
IV
Thus, I would not only reach the merits of petitioner's constitutional claim but also would conclude that it has merit.
The question that remains is the one the Court addresses in
the last two paragraphs of its opinion-whether the constitutional error warrants the conclusion that the death penalty
should be set aside in this habeas corpus proceeding. I think
of serious assaultive offenses, as he concedes he has been, was properly
adduced at the sentencing hearing and was fully subject to explanation by
the defendant." Id., at 886 (emphasis added).
We continued:
"Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death
sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality. We accept that court's view that the subsequent
invalidation of one of several statutory aggravating circumstances does not
automatically require reversal of the death penalty, having been assured
that a death sentence will be set aside if the invalidation of an aggravating
circumstance makes the penality arbitrary and capricious. 250 Ga., at
101, 297 S. E. 2d, at 4. The Georgia Supreme Court, in its response to our
certified question, expressly stated: 'A different result might be reached in
a case where evidence was submitted in support of a statutory aggravating
circumstance which was not otherwise admissible and thereafter the circumstance failed. Ibid." I d,., at 890 (emphasis added).
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that question should be answered by reference to the language of the governing statute-the writ should issue "as law
and justice require." To hold, as the Court does today, that
petitioner's death sentence must stand despite the fact that
blatant constitutional violations presumably made the difference between the jury's recommendation of life or death, violates not only "law," but, quite clearly, "justice" as well.
I respectfully dissent.
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